Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Analysis by Prakash Chandra, Jha
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive





MPRA Paper No. 41769, posted 15. October 2013 03:38 UTC
 1 
Theory of Fiscal Federalism: An Analysis 
 
Prakash Chandra Jha 
Amity University Rajasthan, Jaipur 
 
Abstract: The recent scholarship has made distinction between two generation of literature in fiscal 
federalism. The study has critically analysed the first generation theory and second generation theory of 
fiscal federalism. Though the later approaches the problem of fiscal federalism from different perspective, it 
does not challeng but complements the former. The paper argues that second generation theory is an ongoing 
effort to bulid a theory in response to fiscal challeneges facing a number of countries. In brief, it is aimed at 
explaining present-day institutional arrangements which can no longer be adequately explained by employing 
the first generation theory. 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘federalism’ in fiscal federalism appears to create confusion to many scholars 
because it is used to mean both ‘federal’ and ‘unitary’ political system. It is assumed in the 
theory of fiscal federalism that distribution of tax and expenditure powers between 
different vertical levels of government takes place though informally in country even with 
system of ‘unitary’ form of government. The theory also suggests that ‘informal’ 
distribution of power supplement the ‘formal’ provision of federations and may cause 
‘unitary’ states to function like federal system. China is the case in point. 
In theoretical terms, fiscal federalism, it is argued, helps understand: (i) the factors 
determining the optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation; (ii) principles underlining the 
assignment of functions and sources of finance of governments of different verticle levels; 
and (iii) to design suitable inter-governmental transfer schemes to fulfill the objectives of 
‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ (Rao and Singh, 2005). 
Until the early 1990s, fiscal federalism was a largely unexplored area of fiscal 
policy. But over the last decade, a clear world-wide trend towards fiscal decentralisation 
has emerged. Decentralisation has brought along with it several associated problems 
especially in developing countries. This has led to a fresh debate whether decentralisation 
per se is good for developing countries where sub-national institutions could be weak. 
Moreover, the developments in the European Union (EU) has contributed to the growing 
interests in fiscal federalism.  
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The first generation theory (FGT) of fiscal federalism is associated with 
decentralisation of expenditure responsibilities and centralisation of revenue 
responsibilities for the purpose of achieving ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ in the federation. It 
emphasises the importance of transfers for addressing the problems of vertical and 
horizontal imbalances.  It is largely normative and assumes that federal and sub-national 
decision-makers are ‘benevolent’ and maximises the social welfare. The second generation 
theory (SGT), especially the theory of market-preserving federalism assumes that public 
officials have goals induced by political institutions that often systematically diverge from 
maximising citizen’s welfare. Unlike the FGT which emphasises the importance of 
transfers for mitigating vertical and horizontal imbalances, the SGT gives more importance 
to incentives generated by sub-national tax collection for fostering economic prosperity. 
The SGT has had significant implications for the design of transfer systems so that 
equalisation goals can be achieved without diminishing the incentives of public officials to 
foster thriving sub-national economies. In brief, the SGT is in favour of  decentralisation of 
both expenditure and revenue responsibilities; and it gives minimal role to revenue-sharing 
and inter-governmental transfers. Moreover, it also posits that ‘inter-jurisdictional 
competitions’, a ‘common market’ and ‘hard budget constraints’, may provide protections 
against infringements to market operations. The SGT is a emerging theory.  Though it 
approaches the fiscal federalism from different perspective, the SGT does not challeng but 
complements the FGT.  
This article is divided into six sections. The first section identifies in brief the 
principall reasons for growing interest of scholars in fiscal federalism. The second section 
delineates FGT of fiscal federalism and various issues associated with it. The third section 
identifies and analyses difference between first generation theory and practice, especially 
in developing countries. The fourth section examines the emerging SGT of fiscal 
federalism, especially market-preserving federalism. The fifth section presents a critical 
assessment of the theoretical considerations. The sixth section explores some new 
developments in second generation theory of fiscal federalism. It underlines the fact that a 
host of relevant issues raised by the theory of market-preserving federalism has led further 
works towards building SGT.  
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Resurgence of Interest in Fiscal Federalism 
Broadly speaking, theory of fiscal federalism lays out a general normative framework for 
the assignment of expenditure responsibilities as well as revenue responsibilities to 
different vertical levels of government in a federation and suggests a revenue-sharing 
mechanism to correct fiscal imbalances. (Rao and Singh, 2005) Principal reasons for 
growing interest of scholars in fiscal federalism in the recent times are as follows: 
(i) Until the decade of 1980s, the issues of fiscal federalism used to receive fairly 
little attention even in economics; and practically none in the disciplines of political 
science and public administration. Interest was also confined essentially to the specialists 
of the subject in the US (Tanzi, 1995: 229). However, as the decade of 1990s advanced, 
several countries around the world—developed and developing both—began to 
decentralise their economic powers. The decentralisation trend is often believed to be 
largely as much a consequence of economic globalisation as it is the result of the domestic 
regional pressures brought about by the process of economic liberalisation. Consequently, 
roles and responsibilities of different levels of government not only in federal systems but 
also in unitary polities have undergone a sea-change.  
However, fiscal decentralisation, more importantly in developing countries including 
India, has led to a host of fiscal problems, many of which the existing literature on fiscal 
federalism fails to address. Although many industrialised countries have had a long history 
with decentralised governance, developing countries have recently begun to decentralise. 
Challenges facing developed countries are often magnified in developing countries, where 
the institutions necessary for successful decentralisation are weaker (Rodden, Eskeland, 
and Litvack 2003: 3). 
(ii) Besides, the debate and developments within EU with regard to creating a central 
entity that would transcend the responsibilities of its member-states in some important 
economic spheres opened up the question of how much power should be transferred to the 
central entity. Key issues in the debate are who should be responsible for economic 
redistribution and which functions should be performed exclusively by EU? Thus 
developments in EU have forced the economists and policy makers to critically look at the 
existing theoretical literature of fiscal federalism. 
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(iii) Another factor explaining the increasing interest in fiscal federalism is the 
growing dissatisfaction with the role of public sector, especially in developing countries 
undergoing structural adjustment programmes. Most of the developing countries witnessed 
explosive growth of their public sector in post-Second World War period. The role of 
federal governments in income maintenance, income redistribution and stabilisation of 
economy has expanded. Such developmetal strategies also had found the support of 
economists on the grounds of efficiency and equity (Keynes, 1964).
1
 With the onset of 
economic globalisation and liberalisation however, ‘neo-institutionalists’ or ‘neo-liberals’ 
started questioning some of the traditional or first generation theory of fiscal federalism. 
They stated that greater reliance should be placed on the market and less power should 
remain in the hands of federal government. By questioning the effectiveness of the federal 
government’s role in stabilising the economy and improving the distribution of income for 
the purpose of reducing the poverty and unemployment, some neo-liberal economists have 
reduced the legitimacy of federal government’s greater role and have created a 
presumption in favour of reducing the size of the public sector while giving more powers 
to both market and sub-national governments.
2
 As part of the public sector reforms, many 
countries undergoing economic liberalisation are now considering and undertaking 
devolution of some key functions to subnational-level governments. In terms of resource 
allocation, various arguments have been advanced to support the view that privatisation 
and decentralisation would lead to greater efficiency.  
(iv) Further, mention must also be made here of international agencies such as World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
which also encouraged research on fiscal federalism and decentralisation in order to 
persuade the developing countries to decentralise their public sectors more often to 
legitimise  their own vested interests in market-oriented economic reforms.
3
 
(v) Furthermore, perception that the present-day institutional arrangements cannot be 
explained by traditional theory, which had developed mainly in 50s and 60s, led to 
growing scholary research to examine the new reality. Notwithstanding the growing 
interest in research on fiscal federalism, it is observed that whereas there was consensus 
over the key issues such as which power should be performed by which level of 
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government, in the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, there is no consensus in the 
second generation literature on fiscal federalism.  As Oates (1999: 1145) has put:  
...most of us working in the field felt more than little uneasy when proffering advice 
on many of the decisions that must be made on vertical fiscal and political structure. 
We have much to learn! 
 
This is also perhaps the reason that interests in the subject has begun drawing more and 
more attention both at academic and policy-planning levels in almost all countries, as they 
have come to confront with new fiscal problems; and fiscal federalism has today thus 
emerged as an important subject of study.  
Theory of fiscal federalism have recently been divided into the first-generation 
theory and the second-generation theory. Separate examination of each of them is in order.  
 
First Generation Theory (FGT) 
Cassical normative theory of fiscal federalism is also known as first generation theory 
(FGT).  The FGT “was solidly embedded in the view of public finance that prevailed in the 
1950’s and 1960’s” (Oates, 2005). It offers some general prescriptions on the allocation of 
functions among vertical levels of government and the assignment of fiscal instruments. 
Generally understood, the function of public sector is to ensure an efficient use of 
resources to establish an equitable distribution of income and to maintain the economy at 
high level of employment with reasonable price stability. In other words, the functions of 
public sector can be divided into three branches: allocation of resources i.e. provision of 
public goods and services; redistribution of income; and macro-economic stabilisation of 
economy (Musgrave, 1959; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984).
4
 The FGT recognises the fact 
that both decentralised and centralised forms of government have advantages and 
disadvantages in performing these tasks (Oates, 1972). The FGT thus by seeking to 
combine the advantages of both the centralised and decentralised form of government 
provides the guidelines as to which functions should be placed at the level of federal 
government and which should be placed at the decentralised levels of government. Theory 
contends that the federal government should have basic responsibilities for the macro-
economic stabilisation of economy and income redistribution. This is because federal 
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government always possesses a far greater capability to maintain high levels of 
employment with stable prices than a sub-national government. Similarly, the scope of 
redistributive programme is limited by the potential mobility of residents which tends to be 
greater, the smaller is the jurisdiction. This suggests that since mobility across national 
boundaries is generally much less than within a nation, policy of income redistribution has 
much greater success if carried out at the national level ( Ibid). 
The FGT favours the decentralisation of allocative functions. The so-called 
‘decentralisation theorem’--advanced by Wallace E. Oates--states that “each public service 
should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographical area 
that would internalize benefits and costs of such provision” (Tiebout, 1956: 416; Oates, 
1972).
5
 One of the main proponents of the FGT, Oates provides strong rationale for 
decentralisation of public goods and services on following grounds: 
 (i) The provision of public goods and services by federal government leads to 
uniform level of consumption and utilisation of goods and services respectively across all 
regions. Such uniformity may lead to inefficiencies. Decentralised provision allows 
governments to cater better to the tastes and needs of local residents. 
(ii) The possibilities of welfare gains in case of decentralised provision of goods and 
services are further enhanced by the phenomenon of consumer mobility. “Citizens vote 
with their feet”. This implies that a consumer can to some extent select his place of 
residence that provides a fiscal package best suited to his or her preferences. 
(iii) Decentralisation may also result in greater experimentation and innovation in 
production of public goods and services. With a large number of independent producers of 
public good, one may expect a variety of approaches that, in the long run, promise greater 
progress in the modes of production of such goods and services. 
(iv) Inter-jurisdictional competition as a result of decentralisation may also lead to 
efficiency in the provision of public goods and services. This means that if one 
jurisdiction, for example, discovers a particular effective way of providing certain service, 
the governments of other jurisdictions are also likely to adopt similar techniques, or even 
better techniques and methods. 
(v) Finally, it is argued that the decentralisation of allocative functions may lead to 
more efficient levels of public output because expenditure decisions are tied more closely 
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to real resource cost. If a community is required to finance its own public programme 
through local taxation, its members are more likely to weigh the benefits of the programme 
against it actual cost (Oates, 1972). 
Thus, in brief, normative theortical considerations strongly support decentralisation 
on the ground of efficiency, accountability, manageability, and autonomy principles. 
However, this does not mean that FGT favours a decentralised model for assignment of 
tax. It is important to note/emphasise here that while the case of decentralisation of 
expenditure responsibilities is widely accepted, the FGT is very cautious about the 
decentralisation of revenue responsibilities. Broadly, there are some very major theoritical 
arguments put forth as justification for assignment of expenditure and revenue 
responsibilities; and the next two sub-sections will describe them in some details. 
(a) The Assignment of Expenditure and Revenue Responsibilities 
Allocation of expenditure and revenue responsibilities to different levels of governments is 
the most fundamental issue in a federation. The conventional wisdom is that expenditure 
assignment must precede tax assignment; but not necessarily as a rule. It is so since tax 
assignment is, in general, guided by the expenditure assignment at different levels; and this 
can not be worked out in advance of expenditure assignment. 
As has been discussed in the preceding pages, at the theoretical level, it is argued that 
the federal government should be given exclusive authority in carrying out services which 
relate to stabilisation of economy and redistribution of income. National goods whose 
benefits are national in scope should be provided by the federal government. Similarly, the 
federal government should take the responsibilities for certain services which require 
service area larger than a local jurisdiction for cost-effective provision. These include, for 
example, transportation services, water and sewage, etc. Besides, the federal government 
should also be given a role in providing compensatory grants for spill-out of benefits from 
state level provision of services. A similar role for each state is in order for spill-out of 
benefits from local provision of services within their jurisdictions. All other services could 
and should best be provided by the local governments with federal and state/provincial 
governments having some role in defining minimum standard. Table1.1 shows the broad 
theoretical guidelines in expenditure assignment. 
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The FGT, however, favours centralisation of revenue responsibilities. The reason is 
that lower level government would otherwise engage themselves in ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ 
competition when tax is levied on mobile factors such as capital and labour. Such inter-
jurisdictional competition would turn out to be self-defeating and result in reduction in 
taxation and in turn would lead to under-provision of public goods and services. Morever, 
a decentralised tax system would hinder the functions of internal common market, that is, 
free mobility of resources. Therefore, as opposed to expenditure responsibilities, a 
centralised tax system is often preferred. Benefit taxes such as user-charges and property 
tax are advocated to be assigned to the sub-national level governments. Richard Musgrave, 
on the basis of ‘equity’ and ‘efficiency’ criteria, enumerates which taxes should be 
assigned to federal government and which should be placed at the sub-national levels of 
government. Followings are the broad guidelines suggested by Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1984): 
(i) Taxes suitable for economic stabilisation should be assigned to the federal 
government; 
(ii)  Progressive redistributive tax should be centralised; 
(iii) Taxes on mobile factors of  production are best administered at the central level; 
(iv) Tax base highly unequally distributed between different jurisdictions should be   
centralised; 
(v) Taxes on immobile factors of production are best suited for local levels; 
(vi) Residence-based taxes such as sales of consumption goods to consumers or 
excise are suitable for states; 
(vii) Benefit taxes and user charges might appropriately be used at all levels of 
government. Table 1.2 further elaborates the above guidelines and theoretical insights. 
The preceding sections has briefly examined the normative principles of assignments 
of expenditure and tax responsibilities in a federal system. The practice, however, exhibits 
quite different properties from principles. For instance, in Canada, most major tax bases 
such as income tax are co-occupied by the federal government. Function of income 
redistribution is shared between different levels of governments which is in contrast to the 
FGT, as discussed so far.   
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From the preceding discussions, it is apparent that due to efficiency and equity 
considerations, there is no reason to expect that the distribution of financial resources 
among governments will correspond to the distribution of expenditure responsibilities. 
Thus the federal government has more taxing powers, but comparatively less expenditure 
responsibilities; and, on the other hand, sub-national governments generally have less 
taxing authorities but more expenditure functions to perform. This, in consequence, 
contributes to what is known in the SGT as ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’(VFI) (Shah, 1991). 
Unlike VFI, ‘horizontal fiscal imbalance’(HFI) refers to inconsistency between 
revenue raising and fiscal needs of government at the same level. The different units of 
government within a particular level cannot be expected to have equal fiscal capacity ( 
involving both equality of revenue-raising capacity and equality in costs of providing 
comparable services) except by chance, HFI in a federal system implies the existence of 
some form of revenue-sharing arrangements or equalisation grants to remove the 
inequities. The next sub-section examines this aspect further. 
 
(b) Inter-governmental Transfers and Revenue-Sharing 
A critical component of fiscal federalism is inter-governmental transfers and revenue- 
sharing. Both the inter-governmental transfers and the revenue-sharing arrangement are 
employed to fulfill a variety of objectives.  Invariably therefore, the design of a given 
transfer scheme depends on the purpose for which it is given. The SGT has underlined 
several economic rationales for inter-governmental transfers (Ahmad and Craig, 1997): 
(i) VFI is generated invariably by the expenditure and revenue assignment among 
different levels of government in a federation. In most countries, the federal government 
retains the major tax bases, leaving insufficient fiscal resources to the sub-national 
governments for covering their expenditure needs. Inter-governmental transfer is, 
therefore, needed to balance the budget at the sub-national level. However, individual 
policy choices also play a significant role in determining the resulting ex-post-vertical 
fiscal imbalance. If lower level of government chooses to increase spending or not to raise 
assigned taxes, the VFI would increase. Thus if transfers were designed solely to close the 
VFI, there would be little incentive for lower levels of government to raise own revenues 
or restrict or manage expenditures efficiently. Unless there are objective criteria for the 
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determination of transfers, ‘gap-filling’ to finance sub-national deficits is likely to lead to 
macro-economic difficulties as well as indeterminate ’bargaining’ between the federal and 
sub-national levels of government. Since VFI tends to favour the federal government, the 
size of transfers to sub-national levels of government often may be function of macro-
economic stabilisation concerns. 
(ii) HFI arises because of the fact that some sub-national governments may have 
better access to natural resources or to other tax bases that are not available to others; they 
may also have higher income levels than those in other jurisdictions. These are commonly 
referred to as differences in fiscal capacities. 
(iii) Some sub-national governments may have extraordinary expenditure needs 
because they may have high proportions of poor, old, and young population. The net fiscal 
benefit (NFB), measured by the gap between fiscal capacity and fiscal need, is often 
caused by such uncontrollable factors and therefore should be addressed by federal 
government transfers. 
(iv) Inter-governmental transfers are used to address inter-jurisdictional spill-over 
effects. Some public services have spill-over effects (or externalities) on other 
jurisdictions. Measures such as pollution control, inter-regional high-ways, higher 
education (highly-educated people may leave for other jurisdictions), fire departments 
(may be used by neighbour jurisdictions), etc. Without reaping all the benefits of these 
projects, a local government may tend to under-invest in such projects. Therefore, it is 
essential for the central government to provide incentives or financial resources to address 
such problems of under-provision of certain services. 
Scholars of public finance and fiscal federalism broadly group the inter-
governmental transfers into the following two categories: conditional transfers (or specific 
purpose transfers); and unconditional transfers (or general purpose transfers).  
(i) Conditional transfers may consist of matching transfers; non-matching transfers 
for specific purposes; and block transfers. In case of conditional transfers, the federal 
government specifies the purposes for which the recipient sub-national government can use 
the funds. Such  transfers are often used to address concerns that are highly important to 
the federal government such as projects with inter-regional spill-over effects but which 
might be considered less so by the sub-national governments. As stated earlier, conditional 
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transfers can be of several types -- matching transfers, non-matching transfers for specific 
purposes, and block transfers. Further, each of these may be without a redistribution 
criteria or may be either open-ended or closed-ended. In the case of matching open-ended 
transfers, a federal government contributes the same amount to be spent by the sub-
national governments in an area. In an open-ended matching transfers, the transfers of 
federal government depend upon the recipient’s behaviour. If sub-national government’s 
expenditure is vigorously stimulated by the programme, then the federal government’s 
contributions may be quite large and vice versa. 
Contrary to the above, in matching closed-ended transfers, the federal government 
specifes some maximum amount that it will contribute in order to put a ceiling on the cost 
borne by it. Such transfers are used in most countries because of concern of budget control. 
Different countries employ different mechanisms. In non-matching block transfers, federal 
government contributes a fixed sum of money with stipulation that grant be spent on 
specified public goods or services. In this case, the recipient government is not required to 
match the contribution of federal government. 
(ii) Unconditional transfers, as the name suggests, is characterised by the absence of 
restrictions over its use by the recipient governments. The main justification for this grant 
is to equalise fiscal capacities of different sub-national governments in order to ensure the 
provision of minimum or reasonable level of public services.  
Difference between Theory and Practice 
In the FGT, as discussed in the preceding pages, the federal government is assumed as 
‘benevolent’(Brennan and Buchannan, 1980: 185).6 It also presumes the principal-agent 
type of relations between the federal and sub-national governments in which the former 
can design its own policy without any consultation with the later. The practice may, 
however, provide a picture quite different from that envisioned at the abstract theoretical 
level. It has been noted that inter-governmental fiscal relations are subject to political 
bargaining and compromise by different governments and political forces in federations. 
One can say that inter-governmental transfers cannot be independent of sub-national 
interests. Furthermore, transfers are often made for vested political gains; for instance in 
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order to stay in power and other purposes. Besides, the formula used to allocate the 
equalisation transfers also differs from country to country.  
 Bird and Smart (2002) highlight the political use of inter-governmental transfers. 
They argue that it may be necessary, for example, to transfer some resources to 
jurisdictions that do not really need them. It may also be essential to transfer resources 
simply in order to keep some economically non-viable sub-national governments alive in 
power for purely political reasons. From an economic point of view the problem is to avoid 
inflicting collateral damage in course of achieving whatever be such political objectives. 
Bird and Smart (2002) state that when major changes are made in inter-governmental fiscal 
arrangements, they often result from important political developments that create the need 
and opportunity for change but not the time to think through changes adequately. 
Moreover, once a political settlement is reached in inter-governmental arrangements, it 
often proves exceptionally hard to alter thereafter. Bird and Smart (2002: 899) contend: 
Since circumstances and objectives differ from one country to another country, no 
simple uniform pattern of transfers is universally appropriate but experience around 
the world makes it clear that if services are to be efficiently provided, transfers must 
be designed so that those receiving them have a clear mandate, adequate resources, 
sufficient flexibility to make decisions and are accountable for result. 
 
Barrowings by decentralised sub-national governments in developing countries often cause 
political controversies; and have led to debates and discussions at the academic and policy-
making levels over the negative implications of borrowings, particularly in federal 
countries. It is often argued that federal system is more vulnerable to such problems. FGT 
had failed to recognise the problem; for it failed to see that the sub-national governments 
also influence macro-economic management though not so overtly. The problems of 
borrowing and incurring debts by sub-national governments and thereby contributing to the 
problem of macro-economic management, especially in decentralised sytem in developing 
countries, is admittedly as much an economic problem as it is a political problem. This 
calls for the study of political institutions--an aspect which has been neglected in the FGT 
since it has been confined essentially to the study of economic issues under fiscal 
federalism. It is only now that some interest among economists to study political aspects of 
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fiscal federalism is discerned; inasmuch, some political scientists have also entered into the 
territory of fiscal federalism. Before proceeding further with the analysis, it is worthwhile 
to examine whether sub-national borrowing is per se good or bad; for theory of fiscal 
federalism tends to dabble on this issue with vigour and interest.  
Bird (2004) observes that “borrowing may of course be the economically appropriate 
way to finance capital outlays”. He further argues that in order to achieve both allocative 
efficiency and inter-generational equity, it is often good to finance long-lived investment 
projects by borrowing rather than relying solely upon either current public savings or 
transfers from federal government. Since sub-national borrowings can be good as well as 
bad, it is as important therefore to encourage the good borrowing and discourage bad 
borrowing. But how to discourage bad borrowing by sub-national governments in federal 
developing countries is one of most troubling problems in the area of fiscal federalism. 
Bird afirms that imposing too strict and arbitrary limits by federal government to sub-
national borrowings may have perverse results. This is because debt limits and similar 
controls raise ‘moral hazard problems’ precisely because they prevent ‘market discipline’ 
from being applied (Bird, 2004).
7
 In the OECD federations, bond markets at sub-national 
levels function properly. Sub-national governments have budgetary laws and voters punish 
fiscally irresponsible sub-national governments (Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003: 64). This 
situation contrasts with emerging markets (especially federal states) where the absence of 
one or more of these constraining factors encourages differences between the political 
incentives facing federal and sub-national officials. Under such conditions, federalism in 
fact enhances the possibility that sub-national authorities will have few incentives to bear 
the costs of adjustment policies implemented by federal officials. The lack of incentives for 
reform is significant, as sub-national governments in many federal developing countries 
spend more than half of total public sector expenditure, making the success of adjustment 
policies conditional on their implementation by sub-national governments. Ironically, the 
FGT has ignored the political incentives available to sub-national politicians in 
decentralised contexts and thus have provided an incomplete account of decentralisation. 
The role of sub-national political leadership is thus particularly significant with respect to 
macro-economic stability and reform since sub-national officials often have few incentives 
to manage decentralised spending in a macro-economically responsible manner (Wibbels, 
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2000). Unlike federal government, sub-national governments face few of international 
incentives for economic reform and electoral considerations discourage sound sub-national 
policy, particularly where decentralised politics is dependent on patronage. As a result, the 
fiscal incentives of sub-national governments often run in the directions of over-spending. 
This places a premium on the policy of macro-economic stability pursued by federal 
government. Hence careful attention needs to be paid to sub-national borrowings to avoid 
serious fiscal problems. This can be done either by redesigning inter-governmental fiscal 
relations to reduce the temptation on the part of sub-national governments to borrow 
irresponsibly or by enacting legilation for constraining such borrowings (Wibbels, 2000). 
To sum up, how to avoid ‘soft-budget constraints’ and impose ‘hard-budget 
constraints’ at the sub-national levels, especially in federal developing countries, is an 
uphill task. There are numerous instances, where excessive barrowings by sub-national 
governments have led to fiscal crisis. Since ‘hard-budget constraints’ through market 
forces would take longer time in liberalising economies, this calls for strict legally binding 
rules at least for some years until market forces acquire the maturity to impose ‘hard 
budget constraints’.8 The FGT, as has been discussed earlier, fails to capture these 
problems; some of the new theoretical writings aiming at building a second-generation 
theory, however, deals  with these issues.  
 
Second Generation Theory (SGT) 
Since last deceade, there have been efforts by various scholars-- both politcal scientists and 
economists -- to produce a second-generation theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism. Unlike the 
FGT, the SGT is emerging theory. As Oates (2005)  has noted:  
The key difference, or contribution, of the SGT comes from its focus on the political 
economy of intergovernmental structure–on the incentives embodied in various 
political and fiscal institutions. 
 
The theory of market-preserving federalism is, argueably, one of the most influential 
theory towards building a SGT. The theory of market-preserving federalism has been 
criticised by a number of scholars but it has raised a host of important fiscal issues facing 
liberalising economies. It seeks to complement the FGT rather than challenge it. Before 
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examining the theory of market-preserving federalism, a brief discussion about public 
choice theory merits some attention. 
Unlike the FGT discussed above, public choice theory takes a radically different 
view about government. It regards politicians as ‘rent-seeking individuals’ using their 
positions to pursue private goals, and government as institutions that encroach upon 
individual freedom and seek to increase their hold on the private economy as much as 
possible. Public choice theorists view government as ’leviathan’ and emphasise the 
importance of institutional rules and arrangements forcing politicians to serve the public 
interest in the pursuit of their own goals and limiting their discretionary power (Buchanan, 
1995: 19-27). Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) have articulated a complex positive theory 
about how the politics of public expenditure programmes and budgeting introduces a range 
of inefficiencies. These economists and several others approach the problems of fiscal 
federalism with the assumption of a ‘malevolent government’.  
Scholars of the ‘market-preserving federalism’ build upon the works of public choice 
theorists such as Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, and others, but they do not 
consider government as ‘malevolent’ nor like the FGT they assume the government to be 
inherently ‘benevolent’(Qian and Weingast, 1997: 83-84). Their theory is influenced by 
advances in the ‘theory of the firm’ which studies a wide range of incentive problems that 
plague firms, working under the assumption that no reason compels managers to favour 
share-holders (Ibid) 
9
. The ‘new theory of firm’ shows “how institutional and governance 
structures can be structured so that, in interacting with the market, they align incentives of 
managers with the interests of shareholders”. Just as in the new theory of firm, scholars of 
the litrature of  market-preserving federalism also assume that “there is no natural reason 
for political officials to further the interests of citizens”. Scholars of market-preserving 
federalism take more realistic positions and argue that, if given opportunity, government 
officials will work for maximizing their own interests rather than serving the interest of the 
citizens. Again by drawing parallel with the ‘new theory of firm’, they argue that “the 
appropriate political institutions align incentives of political officials and citizen welfare” 
(Qian and Weingast, 1997: 84). As against the FGT--associated with Musgrave, Tiebout 
and Oates which has been discussed earlier and which is based on ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ 
criteria--and like public choice theory, theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ interprets 
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federalism primarily as a way of imposing discipline on self-serving politicians and 
governments; and attacks the abuse of power and excessive growth of public sector. The 
new theory underlines the fact that growth of public sector, due to centralisation of tax 
responsibilities, have prevented multilevel governments to compete with each other 
vertically as well as horizontally. Lack of competition has in turn led to inefficiency. 
Proponents of the new theory, therefore, maintain that the allocation of tax and expenditure 
responsibilities among different levels of government in a country should be so done that it 
leads to a maximum degree of competition among governments. Competition thus 
arguably would lead to efficiency. The new theory appears to favour ‘efficiency’ 
considerations over ‘equity’. It underlines that competition among sub-national 
governments forces governments to represent citizen interests and preserve markets. It is to 
be noted that Tiebout, as early as in 1950s, had underlined the importance of ‘inter-
jurisdictional competition’ for efficient provision of goods and services (Tiebout, 1956). 
Theory of market-preserving federalism further suggests that, beside efficiency, inter-
jurisdictional competition serves as a disciplinary device to punish inappropriate market 
intervention by lower government officials (Qian and Weingast, 1997: 85). By studying 
economic development in China, it suggests how jurisdictional competition within 
federalism leads to the endogenous emergence of ‘hard-budget constraints’. Further, 
competition among different jurisdictions can also reduce regional inequality without 
centrally-mandated redistribution. Emphasis thus in the new theory is on the natural 
process of equalisation through competition. It sees political decentralisation in terms of its 
fiscal capacity to sustain a productive and growing market economy. (Jin, Qian and 
Weingast, 2005). Its main proponent, Weingast (1995, 1) observes: 
 A fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is this: A government 
strong enough to protect the property of right and enforce contracts is also strong 
enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens. Thriving markets require not only the 
appropriate system of property rights and a law of contracts, but a secure political 
foundation that limits the ability of the state to confiscate wealth. 
 
The main attraction of federalism for Weingast is its potential for providing a political 
system that can limit the ability of the federal government to confiscate wealth of sub-
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national governments while supporting an efficient system of markets. Accordingly, 
Weingast argued that the theory of market-preserving federalism solves this dilemma by 
combining strong sub-national governments with a federal government enforcing nation-
wide free markets and free mobility of factors, goods and services. Weingast classifies a 
federal system as market-preserving if the primary responsibility for regulatory and 
economic development policies remains with the sub-national governments, common 
market is enforced; and sub-national governments have no access to money creation or to 
central government’s bail-outs for bad local projects or excessive debts.10 The market-
preserving federalism, according to Weingast (1995), should meet the following set of five 
conditions: 
(i) A hierarchy of governments with a delineated scope of authority (for example, 
between the national and sub-national governments) exists so that each government is 
autonomous within its own sphere of authority. 
(ii) The sub-national governments have primary authority over the economy within 
their jurisdictions. 
(iii) The national government has the authority to police the common market and to 
ensure the mobility of goods and factors across sub-governmental jurisdictions. 
(iv) Revenue-sharing among governments is limited and borrowing by governments 
is constrained so that all governments face ‘hard-budget constraints’. 
(v) The allocation of authority and responsibility has an institutionalised degree of 
durability so that it cannot be altered by the federal government either unilaterally or under 
the pressures from sub-national governments.  
In brief, unlike the FGT, theory of market-preserving federalism is concerned about 
the ill-effects of the growth of public sector as a consequence of centralisation of 
responsibilities. ‘Competition’ is the main crux of the new approach. It favours ‘common 
market’ which implies that the there is no restriction over the mobility of goods across a 
country. It demands the following assignment rules: local governments should be 
responsible for all policies of economic regulation and development; while the federal 
government is responsible for developing a federal constitution committed to the principles 
of free and open markets, and for monitoring and enforcing its proper implementation. 
Theory emphasises on the importance of federal government imposing ‘hard-budget 
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constraints’ on sub-national governments. It, however, clearly warns that formal 
constraints imposed by strong federal government are problematic. Weingast writes that 
the answer to inter-governmental commitment problems “cannot be simply a written rule, 
for rules can be changed, avoided, or ignored”; and that “a sustainable system of 
federalism…must prevent the central government’s ability to overawe the lower 
governments” (Weingast, 1995). It can be added here that the litrature of market-prserving 
federalism is an attempt on the part of some scholars to provide a second generation 
theory. The theory has attracted lots of criticims in the recent times. But at the same time, 
some of issues and problems raised by it has led to further works by scholars leading to 
renewal of interests in the study of fiscal federalism. Before this is discussed, the next 
section makes a critical assessment of  the theory. 
  
Critical Assessment  
Critics attack the FGT for taking ‘Benthamite view’, which assumes that federal 
government is ‘benevolent’ and would do everything to counter market failure. The federal 
government and its agents are supposed to work toward enhancing the welfare of the 
people. Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) thus maintain: 
It fails to explain why politicians and bureaucrats in fact in the manner they actually 
do or why there are serious instances of elite capture of public services provided, 
even in formal democratic societies characterized by oligarchic power structures. 
Consequently, the analysis does not provide much guidance on how the institutions 
and incentives can be structured to achieve the economic and political goals of 
federalism. When, in fact, the institutions create a structure of incentives which leads 
to redistribution in favour of social interest groups, the very concept of 
decentralization and its ability to enhance efficiency in service delivery is 
questioned.  
  
Both public choice theorists and exponents of the theory of market-preserving federalism 
fail to recognise the role of political institutions and to a limited degree the political 
federalism. In the recent times, however, some scholars have attempted to extend the 
conceptual framework to include additional institutional dimension of multi-level 
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governments. They have extended traditional economic analysis to explicitly consider 
political goals in the government objective functions and examine trade-offs between 
political and economic objectives (Ibid). 
 As has been stated, Weingast and his collaborators lays three main pre-conditions 
for federal system which, in their view, would make a ‘market-preserving federalism’. 
These conditions are: decentralised government has primary regulatory responsibility over 
economy; the system constitutes a common market in which there are no barriers to trade; 
and decentralised governments face ‘hard-budget constraints’. Thus what follows from this 
is that lower levels of government have neither the capacity nor access to unlimited credit. 
Secondly federal government should not be ready to bail sub-national governments out in 
instances of fiscal distress. ‘Hard-budget constraint’ implies that decentralised 
governments must place their basic reliance on self-financing, or own sources of revenue. 
They must not be excessively dependent on transfers from higher levels of government. 
Theortically speaking, the idea appears to be good. But as the experience of developing 
countries suggests, this is unlikely to be a realistic premise for them. Because in 
developing countries, sub-national governments are invariably heavily dependent on 
federal transfers and have limited access to own source of tax and other revenues, thereby 
resulting in greater ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’. It can be argued that to the extent that sub-
national governments manage their expenditure functions efficiently while depending, for 
much of their resources on transfers from a higher level of government, there is no 
problem. At the same time, it can also be argued that uni-directional dependence, as the 
expericnece of several countries including India suggests, could reduce the incentives for 
responsible fiscal decision-making by sub-national level of government.   
While the theory puts excessive emphasis on the importance of federal government 
imposing ‘hard-budget constraints’ on sub-national governments, it does not elaborate how 
that can be done without formal rules. The theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ rather 
clearly warns that ‘formal constraints’ imposed by strong federal government are 
problematic. It fails to explain how ‘hard-budget constraints’ at sub-national level would 
take place, especially in developing countries, where market (unlike as in the case of US 
and Canada) does not impose such constraints. Moreover, ‘hard or soft budget constraints’ 
are inherently a political problem. What goes on in fiscal federalism often is a result of 
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political federalism. Thus any institutional reform for the purpose of establishing ‘hard-
budget constraints’ is not possible for a federal government in a unilateral manner in 
federation. This requires the agreement of sub-national governments which is often 
difficult to come. The theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ fails to examine this 
aspect.  
Both the FGT and the theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ often fail to 
distinguish between fiscal federalism in federal system and fiscal federalism in unitary 
system. The failure to distinguish federal system from unitary system, perhaps for the 
temptation of a broader approach, the new theory too like the FGT considers most of the 
problems of the two different systems as same and thus provides similar solutions. It is true 
that government in federal system has the same general responsibilities in relation to fiscal 
policy as government in countries with unitary system: the maintenance of stability in 
prices, income, employment and the balance of payments and the encouragement of 
balanced economic growth; the promotion of an equitable distribution of personal incomes 
and wealth; and provision of public  goods and services to improve living standards of 
people and achieve an efficient allocation of resources. But whereas, unitary government 
carries out these responsibilities independently of other governments (subject to such 
constraints as may be imposed by the country’s external relationships and subject also to 
any delegation of responsibilities to sub-national governments); in  a federal system the 
responsibilities are assigned between two levels of autonomous governments, for the 
purpose. In a federal system, constituent units have constitutionally guaranteed legislative 
powers. According to Breton, what distinguishes federalism from decentralised unitary 
system is “the ownership of property right”. Thus what distinguishes federal system to a 
unitary system is that whereas in the former power assigned to different levels of 
government can not be extinguished unless the constitution is ignored or amended, in the 
later, delegated power at lower levels of government is at the discretion of federal 
government and can be taken away at any time (Breton, 2000: 15-16).
11
  
The the theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ too like the FGT has tried to 
explain the problems of fiscal federalism in isolation from political federalism. More 
specifically it has failed to account for difference in the political incentives facing sub-
national leaders in federal and unitary systems. Both the first and second generation 
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theories of fiscal federalism therefore have argued that the issues faced by unitary and 
federal countries are largely the same. The difficulty with this perspective is that it fails to 
account for the crucial role of political accountability. The new theory like the FGT has not 
differentiated between decentralisation in nations where sub-national official have little 
power to define budgetary priorities (unitary system) and nations where these officials 
have substantial freedom from federal government in fiscal policy (federal system). A 
unitary system may be highly decentralised in terms of spending without creating any 
pressure on macro-economic performance because sub-national governments have little 
genuine authority to federal government’s policy. In contrast, the importance of sub-
national incentives is accentuated by significant fiscal decentralisation in federal systems. 
Moreover, it is generally observed that  sub-national politicians in federal systems have 
greater borrowing privileges, fiscal responsibilities and political autonomy than their 
counterparts in unitary systems where local and state/provincial governments are primarily 
sub-ordinates to the federal government. Federal contracts/negotiations/agreements that 
result in centralisation or decentralisation themselves result from highly politicised 
processes and such bargains may result in poorly designed federal arrangements. 
Unplanned decentralisation in turn could generate a variety of undesirable outcomes-- from 
severe macro-economic imbalances and low growth to poor delivery of services, 
corruptions, fiscal crisis and inequity across jurisdictions. 
However, as several emperical studies have failed to show the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic performance, hence the argument of scholar of 
‘market-preserving federalism’ that fiscal decentralisation leads to better economic 
performance, does not appear to be very convincing (Oates, 1999). This theory also sees 
only the beneficial side of sub-national fiscal competition as a disciplining factor for 
restraining sub-national government from over-spending. But negative aspects of 
competition have been neglected. There are quite a number of scholarly studies which 
point out that sub-national fiscal competitions, especially in developing countries, have led 
to negative results. Thus, the potential for fiscal decentralisation for improving economic 
and political performance must be evaluated in terms of the specific circumstances of the 
individual country. It is to be emphasised here that weakness/absence of inter-
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governmental institutions often leads to bad competition among sub-national 
governments.The theory fails to recognise this point. 
No wonder therefore, the theory of ‘market-preserving federalism’ has been criticised by a 
number of scholars. Rodden and Ackerman have criticised this approach for its failure to 
characterise fully the nature of the political structures that would comprise a market-
preserving federalism.They state:  
With its lack of political foundations, market-preserving federalism leaves too 
important questions unanswered to be useful as a prescriptive model for institutional 
reform in the developing world (Rodden and Ackerman, 1997: 1571).  
 
Rubinfeld finds the theory “insufficiently specified to serve as base for reliable policy 
analysis”. But he, however, maintains that the model “can be improved rather than 
rejected” (Rubinfeld, 1997: 1581). Wibbel finds the imposition of “hard budget constraints 
by strong centre…misplaced in market-preserving federalism litertaure”. ‘Hard-budget 
constraint’ “is not consistent with the market preserving literature which recognizes that a 
strong centre is likely inconsistent with the market” (Wibbels, 2004: 477). 
Despite being bitter critics of the theory of market-preserving federalism, Rodden and  
Ackerman (1997:1571) have underlined the importance of theory in the following manner: 
It does, however, raise a number of important positive questions that deserve further 
research. The theory of market-preserving federalism moves institutional economics 
and developmental studies in a new direction rich with potential. By examining the 
credibility of commitment made by political leaders in competitive multigovernment 
system, Weingast and his collaborators open up a fruitful line of inquiry. 
 
To sum up, notwithstanding the fact that theory of market-preserving federalism has been 
criticised from policy makers, economists and political scientists, it has, however, raised 
several issues such as the establishment of ‘hard-budget constraints’; common market; 
decentralisation of taxation; among others, which appear to be quite promising. It 
recognises the fact that strong fiscal incentives for lower level of government leads to 
healthier economic development. A number of issues raised by it have led to further 
studies by scholars on fiscal federalism towards building a SGT. There is growing 
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realisation among second generation scholars that the FGT cannot explain present-day 
institutional arrangements. This has/is given/giving rise to new literature. Having crtically 
examined the market-preserving federalism, it is desirable to see what insights some new 
liturature of fiscal federalism provides.   
 
New Developments in Second GenerationTheory (SGT) 
As noted in the last section, theory of market-preserving federalism by Weingast and his 
collaboraters has been subjected to strenuous criticisms. Nevertheless, the theory has 
generated unprecedented interests among scholars to examine many of issues either left 
unanalysed or not adequately analysed. The second-generation literature on fiscal 
federalism today is wide ranging in terms of its sources. Ulike the FGT which was mainly 
confined to the contributions made by the scholars of public finance, both economists (not 
only specialists of public finance but also specialists of other sub-fields of economics) and 
political scientists have/are contributed/contributing to the SGT. Diversity of literature 
makes it difficult to characterise the SGT in a simple and systematic way. As Oates 
(2005,70) has pointed out: 
I find it much more difficult to characterize the second-generation theory. This is, in 
large measure, because it is an emerging perspective that it is quite wide ranging in 
the issues that it addresses and the analytical methods it employs. 
 
The SGT discusses such issues as whether decentralisation is good or bad and what makes 
it so? What kind of political and economic institutions are needed to help decentralisation 
yield positive result? Decentralisation also brings to fore the issue of soft and hard budget 
constrainsts. The issue of ‘soft-budget constraints’ and the ‘perverse incentives’ they create 
at sub-national levels is, arguabley, a major theme in much of the recent literature in fiscal 
federalism. The existence of ‘soft-budget constrainsts’ brings to fore the federal 
government’s policy of ‘bail-outs’. This also represents, one of the principal dangers in a 
decentralised fiscal system. A weak federal government can also result in fiscal problems. 
This does not however mean that new literature oppose decentralisation but it underlines 
that it should be supportated by important institutions. What should be the optimal 
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decentralisation and what institutions is required to support it is again depends on specific 
countries ( Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack 2003; Weingast 2005). 
The problem of ‘bail-outs’, especially in liberalising economy has become an 
important topic for research. New litrature has also examined the factors behind the federal 
government’s motivation for extending or avoiding fiscal ‘bail-outs’ to fiscally imprudent 
sub-national governments. There can be a broad range of potential motives for fiscal ‘bail-
outs’. Especially where sub-national government are politically powerful in case of 
coalition rule at national lavel, it would be difficult federal governments to deny ‘bail-
outs’. The federal government often assumes sub-national debts or make loans to sub-
national governments to avert fiscal crises. In certain instances, as Brazilian experience 
shows federal government’s policy of ‘bail-outs’ makes the resources of the central bank 
available to sub-national governments. Wibbels has examined how federation maintains a 
‘hard-budget constraints’ for sub-national governments. He studies how representation of  
states in the parliament/congress and constitutional rule governing national financial 
decisions affect the likelihood of bail-outs. For example, if upper house gives equal 
representation to the states and if there is the bias in representation in favour of poor states 
then federal government has difficlty in refusing bail-outs. It can be further added here that 
weak federal government in the case of coalition rules at national level and electoral 
consideration of ruling coalition can also explain the problem of ‘bail-outs’. Problems of 
‘bail-outs’, especially in liberalising economy has become an important topic for further 
research. Second generation literature attempts to address how the political and fiscal 
system might be restructured to get out of this dilemma (Wibbels 2004). 
Further, second generation scholars have argued that centralisation of tax gives rise 
to the problems of lage VFI at sub-national levels leading to the large transfers requirement 
from federal government. The large transfers in turn create problems of accountability at 
sub-national levels. Transfers, especially discretionary ones are held hostage by vested 
regional interests and they thus fail to reduce regional economic disparity. Transfers often 
become a mechanism to bail fiscally irresponsible sub-national governments out of trouble. 
Scholars have emphasised that the perverse fiscal behavior is essentially built into 
the political system. The system itself induces fiscally irresponsible behavior: it is 
endogenous to the system. The solution to the problem thus involves a fundamental reform 
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of political and fiscal institutions to alter the whole structure of incentives for budgetary 
decision-making.  
As noted before the theory of market-preserving federalism failed to elucidate 
properly how to create ‘hard-budget constraints’. Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack have 
done case studies of ‘soft-budget constraints’ encompassing developed countries, 
developing nations, and transitional economies and have provided further insights. They 
have observed that ‘hierarchical mechanisms’ to create ‘hard-budget constraints’ at sub-
national level have failed in developing countries. They suggest that ‘market-based 
discipline’ is approprate for creating ‘hard-budget constraints’ for sub-national 
governments. In other words, a well-developed market economy can itself contribute to 
‘hard budget constraints’. If sub-national governments with a poor credit rating manages to 
access to the market for loan, they will either be refused or will have to pay higher interest 
rates. Second-generation scholars, however, contend that a well-developed credit market 
system does not exist in developing and transitional countries. In such cases, constitutional 
rule, for the purpose of imposing balanced-budget constraints at sub-national levels and 
makeing it unlawful for sub-national governments to over-borrow and run fiscal deficits, 
can help in creating ‘hard-budget constraints’ at the sub-national level (Rodden, Eskeland 
and Litvack 2003). 
The second generation litrature also emphasises the decentralisation of tax 
responsibility. The second generation scholars favour an effective sub-national system of 
taxation to provide the revenues needed to finance sub-national programmes. The purpose 
is make sub-national governments responsible for what revenue they raise and what they 
spend. Decentralisation of revenue responsibilites will lead to less VFI, reducing thereby 
sub-national dependency on federal transfers. The second-generation scholars argue that 
the system of inter-governmental transfers must function so as to meet its basic allocative 
and redistributive functions without being subject to manipulation so as to provide fiscal 
bail-outs. The SGT is against discretionary transfers which are often used for bailing 
fiscally imprudent sub-national governments out or electoral gains (Rodden 2002). To put 
in simple words, inter-governmental system should not create perverse incentives for the 
federal and sub-national governments. 
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It is worth noting that perticuler policy measures that are best suited to a particular 
country surely depend upon on the specific political, economic, and cultural institutions 
and its historical traditions. There is no simple, universal blueprint here, but there are some 
useful guidelines. The next section briefly highlights the importance of comparative study 
in fiscal federalism. 
 
Conclusion 
Many factors account for the growing interests of scholars in fiscal federalism in the recent 
times. Globalisation and liberalisation have led to world-wide trend towards 
decentralisation. Decentralisation was followed by several associated problems especially 
in developing countries leading to a fresh debate whether decentralisation per se is good 
for developing countries where sub-national institutions could be weak. Development in 
EU led to questions of how to assign tax and expenditure responsibilities, between central 
entity and member states and what would be the role of inter-governmental transfers?  
International institutions such as World Bank, IMF etc. have also played an important role 
in facilitating the study/research in fiscal federalism. Finally, the perception that traditional 
theory cannot adequately explain the present-day institutional arrangements led to the 
growing interests in fiscal federalism in the recent times.  
Broadly speaking, fiscal federalism is concerned with the proper assignment of 
expenditure and tax responsibilities between federal and sub-national level governments, 
and design of a proper transfer system.  
The study has critically discussed the FGT and SGT. It has been argued that the SGT 
is more in keeping in line with the later-day institutional reality but this does not mean that 
the FGT has lost it relevance. FGT and SGT approach the problems of fiscal federalism 
from different perspectives. While the FGT assumes governments as ‘benevolent’, the 
SGT contends that if given opportunity, government may involve in ‘rent-seeking 
activities’. The SGT has emphasised on the incentives created by political process. Second 
generation theorists have studied two different effect of inter-governmental tarnsfers: 
incentive of federal government to make transfers of funds; and the incentives these funds 
create for sub-national governments. 
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The FGT does not see any problem in giving most of the service delivery functions 
to sub-national governments, assuming that decentralisation of public goods and services 
brings efficiency in their provisions. It also strongly recommends that federal government 
must be provided with more taxing powers than sub-national governments, for federal 
government does redistributive, stabilisation and other functions, scope of which is 
national in character.  
The SGT posits that jurisdictions which provide services, should also have power to 
spend. It contends that that centralisation of taxes leads to ‘leviathan’ governments which 
hinder competition. The theory of market-preserving federalism is one of the most 
influential theory towards building a SGT. It, in brief, suggests that federal system differs 
significantly in terms of assignment of expenditure and revenue responsibilities and only a 
federal system with a particular kind of assignment is likely to improve political and 
economic performance. It further suggests that an appropriately structured federalism 
requires that sub-national governments have real ‘policy authority’, face a ‘common 
market’ and face a ‘hard-budget constraints’ (McKinnon 1997). 
A number of issues raised by scholars of market-preserving federalism have led to 
further research/studies by second generation reseachers on fiscal federalism. Second 
generation research/studies on fiscal federalism today encompasse/s a large and varied 
literature. The first generation literature of fiscal federalism failed to focus on the incentive 
effects of transfer systems despite the fact that many transfer systems around the world 
provide political officials with poor incentives to foster local economic prosperity. The 
ssecond generation literature of fiscal federalism provides several lessons for the design of 
transfer systems. It emphasises the importance of sub-national governments in revenue 
generation with an objective of making sub-national governments more responsive to 
citizens. In the recent times, scholars have come to recognise the critical importance of 
establishing ‘hard-budget constraints’ for different levels of government. ‘Soft-budget 
constraints’ give poor incentives and lead to a range of financial and economic problems. 
A large body of work has been produced relating to various fiscal problems such as ‘race 
to the bottom’, the problems with ‘soft-budget constraints’ for sub-national governments, 
problems emanating from larger VFI, among others. The recent fiscal federalism literature 
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emphasises the role of political and institutional factors in creating adverse incentives for 
sub-national fiscal behavior.  
 
TABLE 1.1: Conceptual Basis of Expenditure Assignment  





Defence F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Foreign Affairs  F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
International Trade F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Environment F S,L Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Currency, Banking F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Inter-state Commerce F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Immigration F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Unemployment Insurance F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Airline /Railway F F Benefits/costs national in 
scope 
Industry and Agriculture F,S,L S,L Significant inter-state spill-
overs 
Education F,S,L S,L Transfers in kind 
Health F,S,L S,L Transfers in kind 
Social Welfare F,S,L S,L Transfers in kind 
Police  S,L S,L Primarily local benefits 
Highways F,S,L S,L Some roads with significant 
inter-state spill-overs, others 
primarily local 
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Natural Resources F,S,L S,L Promotes a common market 
Notes: F – Federal, S – State/Province, L – Municipality/Local   
Source: Anwar Shah, New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil, World Bank Discussion Paper No.124 
(Washington, D.C., 1991), p. 7. 









Customs F F F International trade 
Income 
Tax 




F F,S F Redistributive 
Corporate 
Tax 
F F,S F Mobile factor 
Resource 
Tax 
F F,S F Unequally distributed 
Retails 
sails 
F S S Higher compliance cost 




F F,S F,SC Boarder tax adjustment 
possible 
Excise S S S Residence-based taxes 
Property 
Tax 
S L L Completely immobile 
factor, benefit tax 
User 
charges 
F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L Payment for service 
received 
 
Notes: F – Federal, S – State/Province, L – Municipality/Local, SC –The Council of States  
Source: Anwar Shah, New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 124 






                                                 
1
John Maynard Keynes’ work (1964) also known as ‘Keynesian economics’ systemised the technique of 
smoothing economic cycles through fiscal interventions, and mapped government fiscal tools such as 
aggregate amounts of government spending, deficit, debt, and taxation. Each of these tools helps control 
money supply, allowing government to influence the number of people productively employed, the value of 
money, and the speed at which the economy expands or contracts.  
2
 Public choice theorists and neo-institutionalists led by Nobel laureate James Buchannan 
3
 International agencies such as World Bank, IMF, IADB and OECD have published massive literature on 
fiscal federalism and decentralisation.  
4
 Musgrave (1959, 132-33, 179-83) offers the classic assignment of powers and responsibilities in a federal 
structure from the perspective of what level of government is best suited to handle the various task of 
government. He considers government as benevolent. See also Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, 513-39).   
5
 It was Tiebout  (1956, 416)  who developed the decentralisation theorem, which is also known as ‘Tiebout 
Hypothesis’. According to Tiebout, “his model yields a solution for local goods which reflects the 
preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at national level.” Later on, 
‘Tiebout Hypothesis’ was further developed by Oates (1972).  
6
 Normative literature assume in principle that federal government always uses the grant for the general 
welfare, more realistic approach  led by public choice theorists provides  contrasting views (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980, 185).   
7
 According to Bird (2004) “If a ‘hard budget constraint’ is to be effectively imposed by capital markets, not 
only must there be a credible no-bailout rule, but there must also be full transparency so that lenders have full 
information on borrowers, and local residents have both full information on the consequences for them of 
local borrowing and the ability to influence local decision-makers. To the extent that democracy and markets 
work together in bringing about responsible fiscal behavior, the process is likely to take time.” Giving 
example of Canada, he has argued that “…the hardest budget constraints may be not those set out in 
legislation but those forged in the fires of experience.”  
8
 A number of countries have enacted Fiscal Responsibility Law; and recently in India too, states have been 
provided with some kind of incentives by the union government to enact fiscal responsibility legislation. 
9
 Quian and Weingast (1997, 84) call the new theory as ‘second-generation economic theory’ of fiscal 
federalism. 
10
 Barry R. Weingast (1995, 1-31) goes on to argue in historical terms that the eighteenth century England 
and the US in nineteenth century were systems of market-preserving federalism. He gives credit to their 
systems of market-preserving federalism for industrial revolution in England and thriving market economy in 
the US throughout the nineteenth century.  
11
 Breton (2000, 15-16) notes: “The benefits and costs that literature ascribes to federalism are really benefits 
and costs of decentralization and are, therefore, also present in unitary states all of which are, as a matter of 
observable fact, decentralized. The benefits and costs that are specific to federalism pertain to ownership 






Ahmad, Ehtisham and Jon Craig (1997), “Intergovernmental Transfers” in Teresa Ter-
Minassian, ed.  Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice. Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
Bird, Richard M. (2004), Fiscal Federalism in Russia: A Canadian Perspective, ITP Paper 
No. 0409, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, 
Toronto. 
 31 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bird, Richard M. and Michael Smart (2002), “Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: 
International Lessons for Developing Countries”, World Development, Vol. 30, No. 
6, pp. 899-912. 
Breton, Albert, “Federalism and Decentralization (2000)”, Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 1-46. 
Brennan, Geoffrey and James Buchanan (1980), Power to Tax: Analytical Foundation of a 
Fiscal Constitution. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Buchanan, James M. (1995), “Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for 
Constitutional Reform”, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 
19-27. 
Inman, Robert P. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1997), “Rethinking Federalism”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 43-64. 
Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast (2005), “Regional Decentralization and 
Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 
89,   pp. 1719-42. 
Joumard, Isabelle and Per Mathis Kongsrud (2003), Fiscal Relations Across Government 
Levels, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economics 
Department Working Paper, No. 375,  
McKinnon, Ronald I. (1997), “The Logic of Market-Preserving Federalism”, Virginia Law 
Review, Vol. 83, No. 7, pp. 1573-80. 
Musgrave, Richard (1959), Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
 Musgrave, Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave (1984), Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice. San Francisco: McGraw-Hill. 
Oates, Wallace E. (1999), “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 37, No.3, pp. 1120-49. 
Oates, Wallace E. (2005), “Towards a Second Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism”, 
International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 349-73. 
Oates, Wallace E. (1972), Fiscal Federalism. New York, N.Y.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Inc. 
Qian, Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast (1997), “Federalism as Commitment to Preserving 
Market Incentives”, Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 11, No. 4,  pp. 83-92. 
Rao, Govinda M. and Nirvikar Singh (2005), Political Economy of Federalism in India. 
New Delhi: Oxford University. 
Rodden, Jonathan (2002), “The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal 
Performance around the World”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, 
No. 3, pp. 670-87. 
Rodden, Jonathan, Gunnar  S. Eskeland and Jennie Litvack (2003), “Introduction and 
Overview” in  Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland and Jennie Litvack, eds., 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                    
Fiscal Decentralization and Challenges of Hard Budget Constraints. Cambridge, 
Mass., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp.1-31. 
Rodden, Jonathan and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1997), “Does Federalism Preserve 
Market?”, Vol. 83, No. 7, pp. 1521-72. 
Rubinfeld, Daniel L. (1997), “On Federalism and Economic Development”, Virginia Law 
Review, vol. 83, n. 7,  pp. 1581-92. 
Shah, Anwar (1991), New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil. Discussion Paper No. 124, 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Tanzi, Vito (1995): “Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some 
Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects”, in Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic, 
eds., Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics (Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank) 
Watts, Ronald L.(1999), Comparing Federal Systems. Sec. edn., Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Weingast, Barry R. (1995), “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”, Journal of Law, Economic & 
Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-31. 
Weingast, Barry (2005), “The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional 
Perspective’, in Menard Claude and Mary M. Shirly, eds., Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics (Dordrecht, Netherlands), pp. 139-71. 
Wibbels, Erik (2003) “Bailouts, Budget Constraints and Leviathan: Comparative 
Federalism and Lessons from the Early United States”, Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 475-508. 
Wibbels, Erik (2000), “Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and 
Performance”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 687-702 
 
